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Abstract—Preˆt a` Voter and Punchscan are two electronic
voting schemes that both use paper based ballot forms, part
of which is detached and destroyed, to provide receipt-free
voter verifiability. However, both schemes share the chain voting
problem and the part destruction problem. The first is where
anyone who can see the ballot form before it is used can coerce
a voter who uses it and the latter where a voter who can leave
with the complete form can prove to a coercer the contents of
the vote.
In this paper we provide a comparison of the schemes from
a systems perspective. We also introduce a visual encryption
solution to both the above problems.
Index Terms—Preˆt a` Voter, Punchscan, election integrity,
ballot secrecy, voter anonymity, receipts and coercion resistance
I. INTRODUCTION
PREˆT A` VOTER [2] and Punchscan [7], [3] are bothelectronic voting schemes that provide voter verifiability
through paper based ballot forms. A further similarity between
the schemes is that one part of the ballot form has to be
destroyed in order to conserve receipt freeness and thus
safeguard voter integrity and anonymity [8], [9]. If the voter
is somehow able to leave the voting place with both parts of
the form then he or she can prove the contents of the vote to
a coercer.
As both schemes rely on part of the ballot form to be
destroyed and thus leaving an encrypted receipt, in both the
secrecy of the vote is compromised if anyone can see the
ballot form before it is used by the voter in the booth. Anyone
who can note down information from the form can check
the contents of the vote using the receipt shown on the web
bulletin board after the close of the election.
It is clear that a coercer who can see the form before it is
used can use that information to coerce a voter — but even
if the form is kept safe in transit, a central organisation has
created the form and thus solely holds the contents of the
form. A corrupt election authority can therefore compromise
the integrity of the election.
The schemes thus share two vulnerabilities: chain voting
and enforcing part destruction.
The following introduces both schemes in more detail. In
Section II we compare Pret a Voter and Punchscan from
a systems perspective. In Section III we propose adding a
visual encryption element to both Pret a Voter and Punchscan
in order to provide a solution to the chain voting and part
destruction problem. Section IV details the visual encryption
and scrambling technique and the paper concludes with a
summary and future issues to explore.
A. Preˆt a` Voter
Based on a paper by David Chaum [1] Preˆt a` Voter [2]
introduces a paper-based ballot form to aid user recognition
and simplify use. The ballot form consists of a candidate
list in the left of two columns, the order of the candidates
in a seemingly random order for each form. To the right
of the candidate list is a grid in which the voter marks her
choice. Underneath this grid, also on the right hand side of
the form, is printed a unique onion. This onion encapsulates
the order of the candidate list in a number of germs, each
hidden underneath a layer of encryption. An example of the
ballot form is shown in Figure 1.
The ballot form is created in the pre-election phase by
the election authority which selects all the random germs,
performs the shift of the candidates based on the sum of these
germs and creates the onion by encrypting each layer under
the public key of one of a number of trusted parties, tellers.
During the election phase the voter marks her choice with
an X in the grid next to the intended candidate and detaches
the candidate list which is then destroyed. What remains is a
grid with an X and the onion, making out an encrypted receipt.
This receipt is scanned and the position of the X together with
the onion is transmitted digitally and displayed on the web
bulletin board after the close of the election.
In the post-election phase the voter can check that the
representation of the receipt shown on the web bulletin board
corresponds to the one held in paper form. If that is the case the
voter can be confident that the vote has been cast as intended.
During the tallying phase the receipts are passed as a
batch between the tellers, each of which removes its layer
of encryption and extracts its germ. It reorders the position of
the X based on this germ, mixes the batch and passes it on to
the next teller in order. When all tellers have performed these
anonymising decryption mixes, what remains is a number of
votes in the base order which can be counted.
B. Punchscan
The Punchscan system [7], [3] was invented by David
Chaum and based on his early voting system [1] which relied
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Fig. 1. Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
Fig. 2. The ballot form in Punchscan
on a visually encrypted receipt printed by the Direct Recording
Electronic voting machine (DRE). Punchscan uses a ballot
form printed on two pages, one on top of the other, before
the start of the election. The top page carries a list of the
candidates and associated symbols. It also has a series of
perforations through which the same set of symbols printed
on the second page can be seen. An example of the Punchscan
ballot form is shown in Figure 2.
During the election phase the voter indicates his or her
choice by colouring the symbol on the second page which
corresponds to the candidate on the first page. As the colouring
is done using a ”dauber”, bingo marker, the mark is made over
the symbol on the second page but also around the edge of
the perforation of the first page.
If the two pages are detached after the choice has been
indicated in this fashion they each separately represent an
encrypted receipt of the vote. One randomly selected page
is destroyed making it impossible for anyone other than the
election authority to decrypt the vote. The remaining receipt
is scanned in, interpreted and transmitted electronically.
In the pre-election phase the election authority creates the
data from which the ballot forms are printed. This consists of
a ballot form serial number with the associated ordering of
the symbols on the top page and the ordering on the bottom
page.
Also before the election begins the authority creates a
table of decryption data, holding values for two permutation
functions. If a particular receipt is permuted using these
functions and the decryption data, it will be changed into
canonical form and thus be possible to count. Cryptographic
commitments are published for all of the data in the decryption
table. This means that the decryption data is put through a
publicly available hash function and the result is published.
As a pre-election audit step, auditors select half of these
potential ballot forms, requiring the authority to display the
underlying values so that anyone can check that the commit-
ments are valid. The remaining forms are printed onto paper
and can be used in the election, the assumption being that if
the election authority is cheating then the likelihood of this
being detected in the pre-election audit is substantial.
At least one chained decryption table must exist, each of
which changes the order of the receipts in the table so as
to obscure the identity of the voter. During a post-election
audit the election authority is required to show some of this
decryption data, although not enough to link a particular
receipt to a vote. The more decryption tables that exist, the
more data can be revealed in the audit, making it increasingly
hard for the election authority to cheat.
In the tallying phase the election authority performs the
permutations on the ballot forms as dictated by the decryption
tables and then publishes the result in a result table, consisting
simply of a number of canonical form receipts.
II. COMPARISON FROM A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE
We have already noted that chain voting and part destruc-
tion are common vulnerabilities for the two schemes: Preˆt
a` Voter (PAV) and Punchscan (PS). This section compares
the techniques from a systems perspective in order to identify
further similarities and differences. The structure of the section
follows the structure of Sections 5, 6 and 7 of [9].
A. Subliminal channels
Subliminal channels are where for example the machine
that creates the encrypted receipt includes extra information
such as the contents of the vote or the identity of the voter in
the receipt, in a form only legible to an accomplice. As the
ballot forms of both schemes are printed in the pre-election
phase and a ballot form is selected at random by the voter,
no link can be made to voter identity or intention when the
cryptographic commitments are made. The random subliminal
channels described in [4] do thus not exist.
B. Social engineering attacks
Neither scheme uses a voting machine to create the receipt,
in both the receipt is created by removing part of the plain
ballot form. Attacks where the voting machine reorders steps
in the algorithm in order to learn information which it should
not learn before committing to a receipt are therefore not
applicable.
C. Denial of service attacks
To allow ballot forms to be audited PAV uses the tellers in
oracle mode during the election phase. This is the analogue
of the cut-and-choose method in PS and other schemes. If the
tellers are not all available no audit can take place.
During the tallying phase PAV is vulnerable to the loss
of one or more tellers (unless re-encryption mixes are used
as in [10]) but PS relies solely on one election authority to
perform the decryption and tabulation. Whether this makes PS
more resistant against denial of service attacks is a matter of
discussion.
Furthermore both schemes are susceptible to malfunctioning
or compromised voting machines that submit several copies of
valid receipts or do not pass on submitted receipts.
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D. Discarded receipts
A receipt discarded by the voter indicates to a cheating
entity that that particular receipt will not be checked for
inclusion or validity on the web bulletin board. Both schemes
are vulnerable to the election authority or a voting machine
removing or changing the contents of those votes, be it
randomly.
In [9] one suggestion to overcome this problem is using a
Verifiable Encrypted Paper Audit Trail to allow for indepen-
dent checking of all or a random sample of receipts.
E. Invalid digital signatures
To allow a voter to successfully accuse a malicious voting
machine the cast ballot forms in both schemes are digitally
signed. However, a voting machine may use a non-existent
signature or one of another, properly functioning machine.
The receipt then appears to be falsified by the voter who
cannot prove that the machine is malfunctioning. Independent
checking of the signature in the voting place by independent
organisations is a possible solution to this problem.
F. Insecure web bulletin board
Many electronic voting schemes, including PAV and PS,
incorporate a secure web bulletin board, most commonly in
append-only mode. Security issues are in how to make such
a bulletin board secure and ensure that it presents its contents
correctly to all parties.
G. Undermining public confidence in the secrecy of encrypted
receipts
This is a psychological attack that is separate from the
implementation of the scheme as such, therefore both schemes
are vulnerable as both use encrypted receipts. In short, a party
might question the system without providing evidence that it is
flawed. This may cause concern in voters who are not familiar
with the inner workings of electronic voting schemes.
H. Side-channel attacks
As the voting machine does not learn the intention of the
voter in either scheme, neither scheme is vulnerable to an
attack where information about that intention is communicated
via other channels from the machine. However, both systems
are vulnerable to cameras, invisble marks made on ballot forms
and so forth.
I. Kleptographic channel attacks
As described by [9], PAV is vulnerable to a corrupt election
authority creating ballot forms with an onion conveying infor-
mation about the candidate list order in some other way than
through its full decryption. For example, a hash of the onion
value could indicate the order to a colluding compromised
voting machine.
It seems likely that it is hard for the election authority to
create such a channel in PS because the ballot form has a serial
number instead of an onion. However, one possible channel
might be where the election authority selects the order of the
symbols in such a way that the order on the bottom page can
be deduced from the order on the top page and vice versa.
The solution to this problem in both schemes is distributed
creation of the ballot form.
J. Chain voting
As we have already noted both schemes are liable to chain
voting — in its simplest form described that anyone who can
see the ballot form before it is used can check the plain text
contents of the receipt as it appears on the web bulletin board.
In PAV, anyone who can link a candidate list order to an onion
and in PS, anyone who can note down the order on both pages
as connected to a ballot form serial number, is able to check
the contents of the vote as the receipt appears online.
Anyone who is able to derive the contents of the vote from
the receipt posted on the web bulletin board without going
through the cryptographic steps of the tallying phase is able
to coerce a voter.
The solution to this is to keep the forms secure so that no-
one can read their contents before they are used by the voter
in the booth.
K. Authority knowledge
In both schemes a central election authority creates the
ballot form by selecting the values representing the shift of
the candidate list or the symbols. This authority has to be
trusted not to leak this information or use it to compromise the
election. For example, even if the ballot forms are kept secure
in transit, the election authority does hold the information
needed to perform the chain voting attack detailed previously.
The solution to this must be to create the ballot form in a
distributed fashion, sharing the secret of the contents of the
form between a number of parties. One way of doing this using
re-encryption mixes in PAV is presented in [10] and another
solution based on visual encryption in both PAV and PS is
presented in this paper.
L. Enforcing the destruction of part of the ballot form
The conversion of a plaintext ballot form into an encrypted
receipt is in both schemes done by removing part of the form.
In PAV the candidate list is detached and in PS one page is
removed and destroyed. There may be problems involved in
enforcing this destruction and it might be possible for a voter
to leave with both parts of the ballot form. In such a case the
voter is able to prove to a coercer the contents of the vote.
There may exist physical solutions to this but this is based
on trust in election officials who may in fact be colluding
with a coercer. Another solution based on visual encryption is
presented in this paper.
M. Confusion of teller modes
To audit ballot forms in PAV the order of the candidate list
is re-created by the tellers in real time working in oracle mode
during the election phase. A form that has been audited in this
way must be destroyed to safeguard ballot secrecy. Similarly,
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if a ballot form already used to cast a vote can be audited
this reveals the contents of the vote. There may be physical
solutions to this problem such as two onions, one used for
audit and the other for casting the ballot.
This problem does not arise in PS as this type of audit is
not performed.
N. Summary
From the above it appears that PAV and PS are very alike
when these vulnerabilities are considered — but one distinct
difference is that PAV does place trust in a number of trusted
parties where PS places all trust in the election authority.
III. DISTRIBUTED CREATION OF THE BALLOT FORM USING
VISUAL ENCRYPTION
In order to prevent any one organisation from learning the
content of the ballot form before it is used and potentially
compromising the secrecy of the election its content has to be
created by a number of trusted parties all working together but
the final ballot form should not be visible to any one of these
parties. In this section we review extensions to Preˆt a` Voter
and propose a new extension to Punchscan.
A. Preˆt a` Voter
In original Preˆt a` Voter [2] the candidate list shift from the
base ordering is dependent on a number of germs selected
by the election authority and encapsulated under a number of
layers of encryption, one for each of a number of tellers, in
the onion. In this scheme the secret of the ballot form is held
by the election authority which can compromise the election
by leaking it.
In a recent update to incorporate re-encryption mixes [10]
the ballot forms can be created in a distributed fashion by
a number of clerks. By printing two separate onions onto the
form one can be decrypted by either those clerks or the voting
machine, revealing the candidate list order which is printed
onto the form within the booth. This onion is detached along
with the candidate list and the remaining receipt consists of
the position of the X and the remaining onion, which can only
be decrypted by the tellers.
This change does ensure that no entity involved in the
process of creating the ballot form learns the order of the
candidate list and it hides the candidate list from view until
the form is used to cast a vote within the booth. It does not
however address the problem of ensuring that the candidate
list is detached and destroyed.
As an alternative approach to ensuring that no party learns
the contents of the ballot form we presented a solution based
on visual encryption of the candidate list in [5]. A basic
overviev of this solution is provided here.
1) Ballot form creation phase: The creation of the ballot
form is started by the election authority which creates an image
of the candidate list in the base order. It then visually encrypts
this image by splitting it into two layers, using the technique
demonstrated in [6]. See Section IV for details.
For each ballot form the top layer of this encryption is fed
to the first of a number of trusted parties, tellers. The teller
Fig. 3. The visually encrypted ballot form in Preˆt a` Voter
selects a nonce and uses this to shift the visual encryption of
the candidate list without knowing which candidate is which.
It stores the nonce by encrypting it into the onion. In order
to hide the reordering performed, the visual encryption is also
scrambled using a mask derived from the nonce.
The resulting onion and visual encryption layer is printed
onto a ballot form which may be printed and distributed by a
third party if necessary.
2) Election phase: The voter selects a ballot form at
random, inside or outside the booth. The form is placed on
the voting machine which reads in the onion. The onion and
the bottom layer of the visual encryption of the candidate list
(in the base ordering, created by the election authority before
the election) are passed to the last of the tellers in the sequence.
Each teller then strips off its layer of encryption and extracts
its nonce. The nonce is used to shift the candidate list as
well as perform scrambling. When all tellers have done this
the resulting visual encryption layer is returned to the voting
machine which displays it on a screen underneath the ballot
form. When light passes from the screen through the ballot
form the candidate list becomes human-legible.
At seeing the candidate list in plain text the voter can be
confident that the ballot form is well formed and indicates
her choice by marking an X in the grid next to the preferred
candidate. The machine reads in this mark and stores and
transmits the position of the X together with the onion to
the election authority which publishes it on the web bulletin
board. The voter is allowed to leave with the ballot form as
the candidate list is visually encrypted and therefore does not
have to be destroyed. From this point we regard the candidate
list as detached and destroyed. After the election the voter
can check that the receipt shown on the web bulletin board is
exactly the same as the one held.
An example of a visually encrypted ballot form in Preˆt a`
Voter is shown in Figure 3. A similar visual encryption of the
ballot form in Punchscan is outlined in the next section.
B. Punchscan
Punchscan [7] relies heavily on a single election authority
preparing the election and the ballot forms. It thus requires
a number of modifications to distribute the secret contents of
the ballot form over a number of trusted parties. Recall that
a ballot form comprises of two pages. We propose to change
the bottom page by visually encrypting it.
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One main difference between Preˆt a` Voter and Punchscan
is that the former uses an onion which encapsulates all the
information needed to decrypt the vote and the latter uses
a ballot form serial number which is used by the election
authority to locate the decryption information in its secret
database. Instead of introducing an onion to Punchscan we
suggest that the serial number is used in the distributed
creation also.
1) Ballot form creation phase: In order to keep the contents
of the ballot form secret at all times except to the voter in the
booth, the two pages of the ballot form must not be seen
together by anyone except the voter in the booth. There may
exist a number of ways of ensuring this, for example the form
might be created on demand by the voting machine.
Our solution must entrust the secret contents of the ballot
form to a number of parties involved in the creation of it. As
these trustees are not mentioned by [7], [3] we here name them
similarly to the Preˆt a` Voter nomenclature: tellers. Each teller
must contribute to the secret which determines the correct
decryption of the encrypted receipt. In other words, each teller
must be the guardian of a decryption table as described earlier.
We propose that each teller, in the ballot creation phase,
creates a set of decryption data for the full set of pre-election
potential ballot forms. Each teller publishes commitments to
this data as described in [7].
The election authority creates a set of ElGamal encryptions,
one for each ballot form, with the associated ballot form serial
numbers. The encryption is made under the public key of the
election authority. It also creates a visual encryption of the
symbols on the second page in the base ordering as described
in Section IV. The ElGamal encryption and the top layer of
the visual encryption are then passed between all tellers, each
of which adds a value to the ElGamal encryption representing
its shift of the symbols on the top page and modifies the visual
encryption to represent its shift of the symbols on the bottom
page. The ElGamal encryption is described in Figure 4.
When all tellers have contributed to the ElGamal and
visual encryptions the election authority decrypts the ElGamal
encryption using its secret key and inserts this data in its ballot
form table. The associated visual encryption is also inserted
in the table.
At this point all tellers must work together to show the
contents of the bottom page, therefore the ballot form has
been created in a distributed fashion.
During the pre-election audit the auditors require the elec-
tion authority and each of the tellers to reveal the data
associated with a subset of the ballot forms, for example
a randomly selected half of the set. The tellers show their
decryption data. Anyone can now check that all published
commitments are valid and that the sum of the decryption data
for the bottom page of the ballot form does indeed result in a
plain image of the symbols, instilling trust that the remaining
ballot forms are also valid and can be used in the election.
The election authority now prints the symbols on the top
page in the order it has gained from the decryption of the
ElGamal encryption and the associated visual encryption on
the bottom page. These forms can be printed and distributed
by a third party if needed.
Suppose x is the secret key, y is the public key
y = gx (1)
The election authority generates an ElGamal encryption based
on the base order D0
c = (hD0yr0 , gr0) (2)
The first teller contributes its germ D1 to the ElGamal encryp-
tion
c′ = (hD0yr0 , gr0) ∗ (hD1yr1 , gr1)
= (hD0+D1yr0+r1 , gr0+r1) (3)
The second teller contributes its germ D2
c′′ = (hD0+D1yr0+r1 , gr0+r1) ∗ (hD2yr2 , gr2)
= (hD0+D1+D2yr0+r1+r2 , gr0+r1+r2) (4)
Each of the remaining tellers then contributes its germs until
finally
cˆ = (hD0+Dˆyr0+rˆ, gr0+rˆ) (5)
where Dˆ = D1 + . . .+Dn and rˆ = r1 + . . .+ rn
The election authority who has possession of the secret key x
can decrypt cˆ
hD0+Dˆ =
hD0+Dˆyr0+rˆ
(gr0+rˆ)x
(6)
By searching the field of h the authority can retrieve D0+ Dˆ
Fig. 4. Distributed creation of the ballot form in Punchscan using ElGamal
encryption
Fig. 5. The visually encrypted ballot form in Punchscan
2) Election phase: The voter selects a ballot form at
random either in or outside the booth. The form is placed
on the voting machine which reads in the serial number. The
bottom layer of the visual encryption of the symbols on the
bottom page in the base ordering is then passed to all tellers
in order together with the serial number.
Each teller performs the same reordering and scrambling of
this layer of the visual encryption as it did to the other layer
in the ballot creation phase. When all tellers have performed
their operations the resulting layer is returned to the voting
machine which displays it on a screen underneath the form.
When the light from the screen passes through the ballot form,
the result is a human-readable list of symbols on the bottom
page. The ballot form can now be used exactly as in [7].
An example of the visually encrypted ballot form in Punch-
scan is shown in Figure 5.
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Fig. 6. The two pixel symbols
Fig. 7. The three resulting pixel symbols
IV. VISUAL ENCRYPTION
The visual encryption, or division of the image into two
layers, is the same as presented in [1], in turn derived from
[6]. It is based on the division of each plain image pixel into
four sub-pixels, each of which is one of two different pixel
symbols as shown in Figure 6.
If two of these pixel symbols are placed in different layers
they will yield one of three possible results, shown in Figure
7, when placed immediately above and below each other. The
resulting pixel symbol that is completely black is perceived
by the human eye as black and the two resulting symbols that
have white sub-pixels are perceived as white. Thus, the plain
image is in fact simply represented by white pixels on a black
background.
It is easy to see from Figure 7 that a white pixel in the plain
image is represented by the same pixel symbol in both layers;
it can be either symbol as long as they are the same in both
layers. The black pixel is similarly represented by different
symbols in the two layers, but which symbol is in which layer
is not dependent on the result (nor vice versa).
A. Mathematical notation of the visual encryption
A simple mathematical model for the visual encryption is
presented here to provide completeness.
The pixel symbols are represented by the integers 0 (white),
1 (white) and 2 (black) and thus in this representation the
following is true:
0 + 0 = 0 (7)
1 + 1 = 1 (8)
0 + 1 = 2 (9)
1 + 0 = 2 (10)
It is easy to see that we can use this system to calculate
the contents of the plaintext image when the two layers have
been overlaid. The first constituent is the top layer, the second
is the bottom and the resultant is the plain-text image.
Fig. 8. The image of the candidate list
B. Example of visual encryption
By the following example1 it should be more clear how the
visual encryption of the image of the candidate list is done. An
image of the list is created and shown in Figure 8. In simple
terms we start by creating a bottom, random layer where both
dimensions are twice those of the original image and the area
has been randomly filled with the pixel symbols in Figure 6,
resulting in the layer shown in Figure 12.
Because we randomise the visual contents of the bottom
layer, this means that the top layer will not be random but
dependent on the bottom. From a cryptoanalytic perspective
one might put forth that the fact that all the information is in
the top layer that is printed onto paper and thus no information
about the contents on a ballot paper can be derived from
the pixel symbols used in the bottom layer that is handled
electronically. This could be argued to enhance the security of
the system because the layer handled electronically stands a
slightly higher chance of being stolen.
We now create a representation of the original image,
expanding each pixel into one of the pixel result symbols in
Figure 7. For each pixel, if the current pixel is white then
the pixel symbol used in this representation must be the same
as the symbol in that particular place in the random bottom
layer. Otherwise the symbol is simply the completely black.
This complete representation can be found in the final image
in Figure 12.
From the complete representation of the image and the
random bottom layer we can create the top layer simply by
going through each pixel and checking which symbol is in
place in the complete representation. If that pixel is black then
the pixel used in this layer must be the opposite to the one
used in the bottom layer. Otherwise the pixel in the top layer
must be the same to that of the bottom layer. The resulting
top layer is shown in the middle image in Figure 12.
Thus, the superimposing of the top layer upon the bottom
layer is shown in the final image in Figure 12.
V. THE VISUAL TRANSFORMATIONS
The transformations applied to the layers by a teller do
not have to be reversible. In order to mitigate the buffering
problem described above, they do however have to be possible
to apply in any order and still yield the same result. One can
say that the scrambling of the image is performed in order to
mask the reordering at each stage.
A. Reordering of the list
The teller treats the image of the candidate list as a set of
vertically stacked smaller images (as shown in Figure 9), each
1This example is from Preˆt a` Voter but the application to Punchscan is very
similar.
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Fig. 9. Illustration of how the candidate list is split into smaller images
of which contains the name of one candidate. By reordering
these smaller images the teller also reorders the candidates,
though without knowing which image has within it the name
of which candidate. The basis for the reordering is of course
the germ selected by that same teller in the ballot creation
phase.
In this first instance the reordering of the candidate list is
based on cyclic shifts.
B. Scrambling of the image
Also based on the germ created by that teller, the teller
performs a scrambling of the image so that the reordering is
not apparent to a spectator. If the scrambling is not performed,
it is trivial to simply reorder the image of the base order list
until a match is found. The theory is also that if the same
transformations are applied to both layers, the final output will
be a different but still legible candidate list.
One requirement on the scrambling of the list is that the
transformations must be possible to apply in any order and
still yield the same result, that is to say that the top layer
should be possible to create in a forward teller order and the
bottom layer in a reverse teller order and still yield a legible
list.
To accomplish this the image is divided into a number of
smaller images along the vertical axis, one for each candidate.
The same scrambling is then applied to the same pixels of all
these smaller images. If the scrambling described in Section
V is applied to all these smaller images, it is evident that their
ordering in the larger image does not matter but the result is
the same.
C. Scrambling of the smaller images
The scrambling of each of the smaller vertical images is
simple. The teller uses its germ to create a map of the image
with a true or false value for each pixel. The pixel symbols in
the positions with a true value are switched to the respective
other symbol and those in positions with a false value are
simply left as they are.
If such scrambling is performed in the same manner to both
layers that make up the plain image, this yields the same plain
image as if no such scrambling had been performed. This is
because two of the same pixel symbol result in a white pixel
and two different pixel symbols result in a black. So if the
pixel symbols in both layers are switched to the corresponding
other symbol, the result will be the same.
Layer contents Change Result
0 0 (no) 0
0 1 (yes) 1
1 0 (no) 1
1 1 (yes) 0
TABLE I
PIXEL SYMBOLS THAT ARE CHANGED AND THE RESULTS
D. Mathematical expression of the scrambling
The upper layer L2 and the bottom layer L1 are represented
by two two-dimensional arrays. From Section IV-A we know
that the two pixel symbols in these layers are represented by
the integers 0 and 1. Thus two examples of these layers are
L1 =
1 0 0 1
1
. . .
0
. . .
0
. . .
, L2 =
0 1 1 1
1
. . .
1
. . .
1
. . .
(11)
The sum of these layers is thus
L0 =
2 2 2 1
1
. . .
2
. . .
2
. . .
(12)
Each teller that performs a transformation of the image creates
a two-dimensional array which is a map of the cells that will
be changed. The contents of this array is dependent on the
teller’s germ and some secret function. In the array, the integer
0 indicates that the pixel symbol will not be changed and the
integer 1 indicates that the pixel symbol will be changed to
the other. The following is an example of such an array:
F =
1 0 0 1
1
. . .
0
. . .
1
. . .
(13)
The changes that are performed are shown in Table I and
we can see from it that the resulting pixel symbol in the layer
is determined by the XOR function. We can annotate this in
the following way where G(x, y) is the layer being modified,
F (x, y) is the modifier and R(x, y) is the resulting layer:
R(x, y) = G(x, y)⊕ F (x, y) (14)
The following two arrays are (11) with (13) applied to them:
L′1 =
0 0 0 0
0
. . .
0
. . .
1
. . .
, L′2 =
1 1 1 0
0
. . .
1
. . .
0
. . .
(15)
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Fig. 10. The result of the scrambling
Fig. 11. Teller communication order
We now add together layers L′1 and L
′
2 and form the following
resulting image:
L′0 =
2 2 2 0
0
. . .
2
. . .
2
. . .
(16)
Because the integers 0 and 1 are used to represent the “white”
pixels, we find that those pixels are found in the same positions
in (12) and (16). We can thus deduce that we have altered the
contents of the layers L1 and L2 but the resulting layers L′1
and L′2 still yield the same visual contents to the human eye.
E. Example of scrambling of the image
A Java application has been written to perform the visual
encryption of the image described earlier and the manipula-
tions used in this section as examples of how the scrambling
might work. The application takes an image such as Figure
8, encrypts it by splitting it into two layers and then allows
the user to perform any number of manipulations as described
in this section, saving the results to files. In a test the top
and the bottom layer went through reordering and scrambling
with the same seeds but in different order. Figure 10 shows
the final top layer superimposed upon the final bottom layer
— displaying the candidate list in the legible form only ever
occurring within the voting booth.
F. Election phase visual well-formedness check
When the voter places the ballot form on the voting machine
the onion is electronically read and sent to the tellers, in
reverse order to the ballot form creation phase, as illustrated
in Figure 11. The first teller to receive the onion removes its
layer of encryption from the onion and extracts its germ. It
then takes the bottom layer of the original visual encryption
of the candidate list and using the germ it then reorders the
Fig. 12. Top layer, bottom layer and both overlain
candidate list and performs the transformations described in
Section V.
When all tellers have performed this decryption, reordering
and transformation in order the result is passed to the voting
machine where it is displayed on a screen underneath the
printed copy of the top layer, yielding a legible candidate list.
VI. SUMMARY
In this paper we have given an overview of how visual
encryption can be used in the Preˆt a` Voter and Punchscan
electronic voting schemes in order to mitigate the chain voting
and part destruction problems.
VII. FUTURE WORK
A number of open issues were identified in [5] and thus
they are only listed here:
• Tellers perform correct task with the correct layer at the
correct time
• Ballot form shown in plain text must be cast or destroyed
• Onion must be unique
• Aligning the form properly on the display may be hard
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